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I.

INTRODUCTION

She had sought refuge at [a] domestic violence shelter, and had filed for a
divorce. She had a court order directing her husband to stay away from

her and their three children. But a warrant charging him with violating
that order went unserved ....
[A] . . . deputy went to the

. . .

home and served yet another warrant on

[her husband], ordering him to leave the home. [He] left-but only long
enough to get his shotgun from his parked truck.
Returning to the house, he killed his wife and two of their three
children, wounding the third. Then he used the gun to end his own
life ....

[The deputy was still present when the murders occurred.]'

As this tragic story indicates, incidents of domestic violence are
not unknown in West Virginia. In recent years, West Virginia has
experienced a, "fifty-two percent increase in reported domestic violence
cases,"2 and women in West Virginia are "more likely to be assaulted,
raped or killed by a male partner than by a stranger."3 Despite these
grim statistics, three-fourths of all domestic violence complaints in
1991 were treated as simple assaults, while arrests were made in only
twelve percent of all domestic violence incidents reported.'
In light of these vivid facts, state legislators have attempted to
provide protection for victims of domestic violence.' Current West

1. The System Doesn't Work, THE HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington, W. Va.), July 11,
1993, at D2 [hereinafter The System Doesn't Work].
2. W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FAMILY VIOLENCE: YOU CAN
HELP BREAK THE CYCLE! 1 (1993) [hereinafter W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,

FAMILY VIOLENCE].

3. Id.
4. Id.

(n.d.)).
5.

(citing W. VA. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

1991 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT

West Virginia defines domestic, or family, violence as:
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Virginia law enables a victim to obtain a protective order,6 temporary
order,7 or restraining order.' These protective orders 9 empower victims insofar as they prohibit the alleged abuser from assaulting the
victim; contacting or harassing the victim; approaching the victim at
the victim's home, school, or work place; and attempting to contact the
victim through contacting the victim's family or relatives.'0 Yet beyond these specific measures, protective orders afford the victim little
protection from the alleged abuser."
the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household

members:
(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing physical harm to another with or without dangerous or deadly weapons;
(2) Placing another in reasonable apprehension of physical harm;
(3) Creating fear of physical harm by harassment, psychological abuse or
threatening acts;
(4) Committing either sexual assault or sexual abuse . . . ; and
(5) Holding, confining, detaining or abducting another person against that
person's will.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2(a)(1)-(5) (Supp. 1994).
6. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (Supp. 1994) (explaining procedure for obtaining a protective order).
7. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5 (Supp. 1994) (explaining procedure for obtaining a temporary order).
8. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13(a)(12) (Supp. 1994) (explaining procedure for obtaining a
restraining order).
9. W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-6(a)(6), 48-2A-6(a)(8) (Supp. 1994). The term "protective
order" will be used to refer collectively to protective orders, temporary orders, and restraining orders. In situations in which a distinction among these three types of orders is required,
the appropriate designation will be made.
10. Despite this article's gender neutral language, the vast majority of domestic violence victims are women. See NAT'L WOMAN ABUSE PkEVENTION PROJECT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACT SHEETS: GENERAL FACTS ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE I (n.d.) [hereinafter
NAT'L WOMAN ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT] ("[a]pproximately 95% of the victims of domestic violence are women"); see also FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, THERE'S No
EXCUSE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (n.d.) ("95 percent of domestic violence incidents are
perpetrated by men").
Furthermore, in instances where the protection afforded to domestic violence victims
is discussed, the protection granted extends not only to the victim, but also to the victim's
children, family, and other members of the victim's household. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A2(b) (Supp. 1994).
11. The term "alleged abuser" has been chosen to represent those who are charged
with committing domestic violence offenses or violating the various orders available to victims of domestic violence. They are "alleged" abusers because often their responsibility for
the domestic violence incident is determined at a later hearing, subsequent to the issuance of
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Until recently, a protective or temporary order could be enforced
in West Virginia only by a law-enforcement officer's direct observance
of the violation"2 or by a victim's request for an arrest warrant. 3

Similarly, in cases of restraining order violations, domestic violence
victims had little protection: law-enforcement officers had no authority
to arrest the alleged abuser unless the violation was committed in the
officers' presence. 4
However, West Virginia has attempted to remedy the inadequate
protection of domestic violence victims. The penalty an alleged abuser
faces for a violation of these orders is rather significant.' An alleged
abuser faces the possibility of a one-day to one-year jail sentence, with
a mandatory twenty-four hour minimum confinement." Moreover, an
alleged abuser is also required to pay a fine ranging from two hundred
fifty to two thousand dollars for violating the order. 7

Additionally, on March 2, 1994, the West Virginia legislature
enacted the probable cause warrantless arrest statute.' 8 Effective on
May 31, 1994, this statute enables law-enforcement officers to exercise
a broader arrest power over alleged abusers who commit domestic
violence offenses or who violate protective orders.'
the order. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5(b) (Supp. 1994).
12. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10c(a) (Supp. 1994).
13. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10b(b) (Supp. 1994). See also NAT'L CENTER ON WOMEN
AND FAM. L., ARREST IN DOMESTIc VIOLENCE CASES: A STATE BY STATE SUMMARY 11
(1987) [hereinafter NAT'L CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAM. L.].
14. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13(a)(12) (Supp. 1994). A victim may also request an arrest
warrant to enforce restraining orders. Id. See also W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10b(b) (Supp.
1994). But see W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10c(a) (Supp. 1994).
15. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10d (Supp. 1994).
16. Id.
17. Id
18. See H.B. 4013, 71st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1994) [hereinafter H.B. 4013] ("[p]assed
March 2, 1994; in effect ninety days from passage"); see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14
(Supp. 1994).
19. The probable cause warrantless arrest statute provides that:
[A] law-enforcement officer has authority to arrest the alleged perpetrator for said
offense when:
(1) The law-enforcement officer has observed credible corroborative evidence
that the offense has occurred; and
(2) The law-enforcement officer has received, from the victim or a witness, a
verbal or written allegation of facts constituting a violation of [§ 61-2-28] of
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West Virginia's probable cause warrantless arrest statute is not a
unique response to domestic violence. In fact, each of the other fortynine states2" have previously enacted some form of probable cause
warrantless arrest statute, enabling law-enforcement officers to respond
more effectively to incidents of domestic violence and to violations of
protective orders. These provisions permit officers to arrest the alleged
abuser at the scene of the incident, or in the immediate vicinity thereof, provided that probable cause for the arrest exists.2"
Apart from the increased protection that these laws provide to
domestic violence victims, an additional incentive exists for the passage
of these statutes: the proposed $25 million federal grant competition
for domestic violence programs. 2 The eligibility criteria for this fund-

this code [criminal penalties for domestic battery and domestic assault]; or
(3) The law-enforcement officer has observed credible evidence that the accused committed the offense.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a) (Supp. 1994). See also W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (Supp. 1994).
20. Barbara Hart, Arrest and Law Enforcement Codes 87, 88 (n.d.) [hereinafter Hart]
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Letter from Joan Zorza, Senior Attorney,
National Battered Women's Law Project, to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, Team Coordinators,
West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence 2 (Feb. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Letter
from Joan Zorza to Sue Julian & Diane Reese] (on file with author). See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1904(a)(4) (1987), amended by Public Act 160 § 5 (effective Jan. 16, 1994)
(warrantless arrest lawful for misdemeanors involving physical injury or illegal sexual contact
or threat thereof, regardless of police officer's presence); IDAHO CODE § 19-603(6) (Supp.
1994) (discretionary probable cause warrantless arrest for domestic disturbance); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-6-311(2) (1993) (arrest as preferred response to domestic abuse calls); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7(A) (Michie 1984) (discretionary probable cause warrantless arrest for
domestic disturbance); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Anderson 1993) (discretionary
probable cause warrantless arrest for domestic violence); OR. REv. STAT. § 133.055(2)(a)
(1993) (mandatory probable cause warrantless arrest for domestic abuse); VT. CT. R. CrUM.
P. 3(a)(2) (Supp. 1993) (discretionary probable cause warrantless arrest for assault against
family or household member).
For a complete list of warrantless arrest statutes in the forty-nine states, see NAT'L
CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAM. L., supra note 13, at 5-11; John Myers et al., Special Report: Domestic Violence Prevention Statutes, MCGEORGE SCH. OF L., U. OF THE PAC. 5
(1992).
21. See supra note 20. Probable cause for the arrest exists if the officer has "probable
cause that a misdemeanor domestic violence offense has occurred." Letter from Joan Zorza
to Sue Julian & Diane Reese; supra note 20, at 2.
22. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993). See also Letter from Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., U.S. Senator/Chairman, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to Diane Reese
and Sue Julian, Team Coordinators, West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence 1
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ing require states to enact probable cause warrantless arrest statutes, or
comparable provisions, to demonstrate their commitment to combatting
the national tragedy of domestic violence.23
Thus, West Virginia, recognizing the grim realities of domestic
violence in this state,24 and sorely in need of such funding to adequately train law-enforcement officials,25 has also enacted a probable
cause warrantless arrest statute.
The purpose of this article is to examine the basic features of
probable cause warrantless arrest statutes and to provide a better un-

derstanding of West Virginia's own probable cause warrantless arrest
statute. Part II will provide an overview of the probable cause warrantless arrest statutes of the forty-nine states that have enacted these statutes prior to West Virginia's passage of its probable cause warrantless
arrest statute. In Part III, this Note will explore West Virginia's history
of arrest authority in domestic violence situations, with special emphasis on its previous telephone authorization statute and its current probable cause warrantless arrest statute. Part IV will analyze the general

features of probable cause warrantless arrest provisions in an attempt to
explain the advantages and disadvantages of probable cause warrantless

(Dec. 10, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator/Chairman, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to Diane Reese and Sue
Julian, Team Coordinators, West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence 1 (Feb. 26,
1993) (on file with author); Letter from John D. Rockefeller, IV, U.S. Senator, United
States Senate, to Diane Reese & Sue Julian, Team Coordinators, West Virginia Coalition
Against Domestic Violence 1-2 (Feb. 2, 1993) (on file with author).
23. See supra note 22.
24. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-l(a)(3) (Supp. 1994) (stating that "[flamily violence is
a major health and law-enforcement problem in this state"); see also W. VA. FAMILY PROTECTiON ADVISORY BOARD, DomEsTIc VIOLENCE: A MANUAL FOR POLICE PROFESSIONALS
5, 7 (1993) [hereinafter W. VA. FAmILY PROTECnON ADVISORY BOARD] (noting that "6,029
domestic violence complaints were filed in West Virginia in 1992" indicating "a 30% increase over 1990 complaints" and that 29% of all 1991 West Virginia homicides were related to domestic violence).
25. See W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra
note 2, at 2 (noting that a probable cause warrantless arrest statute would "allow West Virginia access to federal funds . . . from the federal Violence Against Women Act for law[]enforcement and judicial officer training"); see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-1(a)(3) (Supp.
1994) (stating that "[flamily violence is a major health and law-enforcement problem in this
state").
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arrests in domestic violence situations and to discern the suitability of
this model in actual practice. Finally, in Part V, this Note will scrutinize the West Virginia probable cause warrantless arrest statute, with
special regard for the advantages and disadvantages of such a statute in
West Virginia and its likely results in providing additional protection to
victims of domestic violence.
Il.

OVERVIEW OF PROBABLE CAUSE WARRANTLESS ARREST
STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES

Every state, including West Virginia,26 authorizes law-enforcement
officers to arrest alleged abusers in response to domestic violence complaints without a warrant if the officer finds that probable cause exists
to support the arrest.27 However, police officers have not always been
so eager to assist victims of domestic violence. 8 This policy change
is the result of a long and arduous struggle by domestic violence victims to attain equality of justice and to convince law-enforcement authorities that they, like other victims, have been the targets of real and
serious crimes.
In the 1970s, advocates called the nation's attention to the grave
injustices faced by victims of domestic violence when such victims
sought police protection.29 Despite the fact that "an assault is a crime,
regardless of the relationship of the parties"3 and that "[a] person
beaten in the home is no less a victim than a person beaten on the
sidewalk in front of the home," 31 many times the law "stop[ped] at

26. See supra text accompanying note 20.
27. See supra note 21.
28. Traditional attitudes of law-enforcement officials in response to domestic violence
complaints include a failure to take "'the situation seriously"' after learning that the victim
is married to the alleged abuser and comments such as "'lady, it's his house, he can do
what he wants."' U.S. ArT'Y GEN. TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

19, 23 (1984) (victims' statements).

29. Lisa A. Frisch, Research that Succeeds, Policies that Fail, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 209 (1992) [hereinafter Frisch].
30. Id. at 211 (quoting U.S. ATr'Y GEN. TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra

note 28).
31.

Frisch, supra note 29, at 211.
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the front door of the family home,"32 thus providing little or no assistance to the domestic violence victim.
The changes sought by victims were far from radical; the pleas
amounted to simple requests that "battered women be treated with
fairness" ' and that they "be provided [with] an opportunity for justice."34 Advocates hoped that by treating the crime of domestic violence as a serious and legitimate offense, society would become less
willing to ignore the problem and more willing to punish the alleged
abusers. 5 Thus, law-enforcement officers would be obligated to treat
incidents of domestic violence as more than mere "minor offense[s]. 36
In response to this movement, which brought to the public's attention the secret tragedy of domestic violence, many states enacted probable cause warrantless arrest statutes. 37 These provisions authorized
law-enforcement officers to arrest an alleged abuser without a warrant
if an officer had probable cause to believe that a domestic violence
incident had occurred and that the alleged abuser was the perpetrator
or responsible party.3 ' This increased arrest authority extended past the
common law limitation, which had allowed probable cause arrest only
for felonies, 39 and permitted law-enforcement officials to make probable cause arrests for offenses that would normally be classified as misdemeanors.4" Therefore, officers obtained the authority to arrest the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 209.
34. Id.
35. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 206 (1992); Frisch, supra note 29, at 209-10.

36. LISA LERMAN, CENTER FOR WOMEN POL'Y STUD., RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE
FAMILY, LEAFLET No. 10, EXPANSION OF POLICE ARREST POwER: A KEY TO EFFECTIVE
INTERVENTION 2 (1980) [hereinafter LERMAN].
37. See, e.S,, Frisch, supra note 29, at 210 n.5 (discussing New York's statute). See
also Letter from Joan Zorza to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, supra note 20, at 3.
38. See supra note 37.
39. At common law, officers have the authority to effectuate probable cause warrantless arrests in situations where a felony has been committed even if the officer did not
observe the commission of the crime. NAT'L CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAM. L., supra note
13, at 2; Memorandum of Law from David B. McMahon, Attorney at Law, West Virginia
Legal Services Plan, Inc. 2 (Dec. 8, 1992) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law from David B.
McMahon] (on file with author).
40. LERMAN, supra note 36, at 2. Lerman notes that:
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alleged abuser in typically misdemeanor situations, without a warrant,
and without having observed the domestic violence incident.
In addition to a heightened societal awareness of domestic violence, victims themselves had a profound and direct impact upon the
enactment of probable cause warrantless arrest statutes. Domestic violence victims, frustrated with law-enforcement officials' inadequate
protection and reluctance to respond to domestic violence complaints,
instituted numerous lawsuits against various police departments for
following "arrest-avoidant practices."'" Common attitudes among lawenforcement officials were "we don't want to get involved"42 and the
officers' failure to acknowledge the seriousness of domestic violence
incidents.43 Victims' challenges to arbitrary and discretionary arrest
procedures invalidated these "arrest-avoidant" practices under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' Thus, the courts' resolution of these suits resulted in assurances of the equal protection of
domestic violence victims: law-enforcement officers were no longer
free to arbitrarily use their discretion when making arrests, and they
were required to fully appraise the extent of the situation before automatically refusing to arrest the alleged abuser.45
Finally, many remaining states enacted probable cause warrantless
arrest statutes in response to the discovery of the deterrent effect that
these arrests have on abusers." In 1983, Lawrence Sherman and RichPolice generally perceive family abuse as a minor offense, especially where there
has been no serious injury or the injury is not visible. If mate abuse is perceived
as a misdemeanor, and the law allows warrantless arrest only in felony cases, the
police may not arrest because of a perceived need to obtain a warrant.
Id. Thus, where probable cause warrantless arrest statutes are enacted, an officer is able to
immediately arrest the alleged abuser without first having to obtain a warrant. See also Letter from Joan Zorza to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, supra note 20, at 2; NAT'L CENTER ON
WOMEN AND FAM. L., supra note 13, at 2.
41. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). See also Frisch, supra note 29,
at 210 n.6, 211 nn.9 & 13.
42. Frederic M. Biddle, State Urges Police to Arrest Abuse Suspects, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 25, 1991, at I [hereinafter Biddle].
43. See supra note 28.
44. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d at 696; Thurman v. City of Torrington,
595 F. Supp. at 1527.
45. Frisch, supra note 29, at 211. See also supra note 41.
46. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
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ard Berk conducted an experiment in Minneapolis, Minnesota, to evaluate the effect that various law-enforcement responses-mediation,
separation, and arrest-had on the recurrence of domestic violence
incidents. 7 The researchers concluded that, of all of the response
methods studied, arrest proved to be the most efficient deterrent to
domestic violence. 8 Hence, many states49 responded to this new information by announcing their lack of tolerance of domestic violence
and by implementing probable cause warrantless arrest statutes to deter
the commission of these crimes.
To date, every state in the United States has some type of probable cause warrantless arrest statute.50 Warrantless arrest statutes vary
in the amount and type of authority afforded to law-enforcement officers: mandatory arrests"1 versus discretionary arrests;52 arrests in response to domestic violence incidents53 versus arrests in response to
violations of protective orders;54 and pre-arrest requirements for consent from the victim to arrest the alleged abuser55 versus automatic
arrest. 6 However, each of these provisions has recognized the need to
grant broader arrest authority to officers in order to effectively respond
to domestic violence situations and to afford adequate protection to the
victims involved.
The provisions of the state of Vermont deserve particular attention.
While Vermont's statutes do not specifically authorize probable cause
warrantless arrests in domestic violence situations, the state has never-

Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Jennifer Toth, New Study of Domestic Violence Finds Mandatory Arrests Backfire, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at A5 [hereinafter Toth].
47. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, 1 POLICE FOUND. REP. 1-8 (1984) [hereinafter Sherman & Berk]. See also
Frisch, supra note 29, at 212; Hart, supra note 20, at 98.
48. Sherman & Berk, supra note 47, at 1.
49. See supra note 46.
50. See supra text accompanying note 20.
51. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 133.055(2)(a) (1993).
52. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-603(6) (Supp. 1994).
53. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7(A) (Michie 1984).
54. See, e.g., N.H. RE.. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8(I)(a) (Supp. 1994).
55. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Anderson 1993).
56. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2) (1993).
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theless granted this authority to law-enforcement officers. 7 The court
rules of criminal procedure in Vermont permit probable cause warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases "when the officer has probable
cause to believe a person has committed a misdemeanor . . . which
' Thus, in
involves an assault against a family or household member."58
the absence of statutory law, courts in Vermont have developed local
rules in order to grant this extensive arrest power to law-enforcement
officials.
With the recent adoption of West Virginia's probable cause warrantless arrest statute, the states truly have become "united" in response
to the pleas of domestic violence victims. 9

III.

THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBABLE CAUSE WARRANTLESS
ARREST STATUTE

Previously established West Virginia statutory and common law
authorize law-enforcement officers to make arrests in response to domestic violence incidents via several distinct routes: (1) by common
law, (2) in limited statutory areas, and (3) with victim self-help.6" Prior to the recent enactment of the probable cause warrantless arrest
statute, which further extends this arrest authority, the predecessor
telephone authorization statute attempted to grant additional authority to
law-enforcement officials to arrest an alleged abuser.6 However, this
statute required that the officers first receive telephone authorization
from a magistrate in order to make such an arrest.62
In response to numerous concerns regarding the feasibility of obtaining telephonic authorization in rural areas and the dangerous delays
that would inevitably result from these procedural requirements,63 the
57. VT. CT. R. Cum. P. 3(a)(2) (Supp. 1993).
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying note 20.
60. Memorandum of Law from David B. McMahon, supra note 39, at 2; W. VA.
CODE §§ 48-2A-10, 48-2A-10c(a) (Supp. 1994).
61. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); DELEGATES BROWN ET
AL., W. VA. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. ABSTRACT: BILL No.: H.B. 2427, 71st Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess., at 3-4 (Mar. 2, 1993) [hereinafter H.B. 2427].

62. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(3) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
63. See infra Part III.B.3. See also W. VA. COALmON AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
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West Virginia legislature repealed the telephone authorization statute
4
and replaced it with the probable cause warrantless arrest statute.6
Thus, West Virginia followed the forty-nine other states in permitting
law-enforcement officials to make a probable cause warrantless arrest
in response to domestic violence situations.65
A.

EstablishedArrest Authority

Before West Virginia enacted the probable cause warrantless arrest
statute, law-enforcement officials derived their authority to make arrests
in domestic violence situations from three distinct sources: (1) common
law, (2) statutory authority, and (3) victim self-help remedies. 66
1.

Common Law

At common law, an officer may arrest a perpetrator for a crime
not committed in his/her presence if (1) the crime is a felony, (2) the
officer has probable cause to believe that the crime was committed,
and (3) the perpetrator committed the crime. 7 However, when domestic violence incidents are regarded as misdemeanors and lesser offenses,
this common law authority does not
apply, and thus, officers are unable to arrest the alleged abuser.68 For example, three-fourths of all
West Virginia domestic violence complaints in 1991 were treated as
simple assaults; because these incidents were regarded as fairly minor
offenses, law-enforcement officials were, for the most part, unable to
arrest the alleged abusers without a warrant.69

THE FACTS ABOUT PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST I (n.d.) [hereinafter W. VA. COALITION
AGAINST DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE, PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST] (noting that the telephone autho-

rization statute was "unworkable in situations when there is no telephone available, because
a police officer cannot secure telephone authorization through a dispatcher").
64. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14 (Supp. 1994).
65. See supra text accompanying note 20.
66. See supra note 60.
67. State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449, 452 (W. Va. 1985); State v. Farmer, 315
S.E.2d 392, 395 (W. Va. 1983); Memorandum of Law from David B. McMahon, supra note
39, at 2.
68. See supra note 67.
69. W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMEsTIC VIOLENCE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note
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2. Statutory Authority
However, law-enforcement officials do have the statutory authority
to arrest alleged abusers in limited domestic violence circumstances in
which they classify the offense as a misdemeanor." If an officer sees
an alleged abuser violating a protective order, the officer must arrest
the alleged abuser at the scene. This authority to arrest is not discretionary; rather, the officer is required to arrest the alleged abuser.72
3.

Victim Self-Help Remedies

In two situations law-enforcement officials have the power to arrest the alleged abuser without having witnessed the domestic violence
incident.73 However, this authority exists only after the victim has sufficiently completed a variety of self-help prerequisites.74 The first instance involves granting the officer permission to enter the victim's
residence, without a warrant, to arrest the alleged abuser for a violation
of the protective order.75 In order to provide such authority, a victim
is required to file an affidavit granting such permission to law-enforcement officials at the same time that the victim files the protective order.76 In the absence of this affidavit, an officer without a warrant
may not enter the victim's residence to arrest the alleged abuser.77
The second instance requires the victim to apply for an arrest
warrant in order that the protective order may be enforced.78 In this

2, at 1 (citing W. VA. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 4).
70. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10c(a) (Supp. 1994).
71. Id.
72. The statutory language provides that "[wlhen a law-enforcement officer observes
[a] knowing and willful violation of the terms of a temporary or final protective order . . .
he or she shall immediately arrest the respondent." W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10c (a) (Supp.
1994) (emphasis added).
73. W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-10, 48-2A-10b(b) (Supp. 1994).
74. See supra note 73.
75. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10 (Supp. 1994).
76. Id.
77. See State v. Farmer, 315 S.E.2d at 395.
78. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10b(b) (Supp. 1994).
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situation, a victim must appear before a court and show, by probable

cause, that the alleged abuser has violated the order.79 After the victim has completed these procedures, and if the court finds that the
victim has shown probable cause, an arrest warrant will be issued for
the alleged abuser."0
B. PredecessorStatutory Authority: The Telephone
Authorization Statute
The telephone authorization statute, the predecessor of the probable
cause warrantless arrest statute, attempted to grant law-enforcement
officials greater arrest authority to respond to domestic violence situa-

tions. However, this provision required law-enfoicement officers to
obtain a magistrate's telephonic approval prior to making the arrest.8

As a result of this conditional arrest authority, the telephone authorization statute proved to be an ineffectual means of protecting domestic
violence victims. 2

1.

Legislative History of the Telephone Authorization Statute

The telephone authorization statute as it was originally proposed
would have allowed officers much greater arrest authority with regard
to domestic violence incidents.8 3 The statute's draft version84 included

79. Id.
80. Id. One further example of victim self-help should be noted. The victim may bring
contempt charges against an alleged abuser who violates a protective order. W. VA. CODE §
48-2A-10a(a) (Supp. 1994). While this proceeding does not result in an immediate arrest, the
court may require the alleged abuser to comply with the provisions of the protective order
and to post a surety bond to personally guarantee that the alleged abuser will not violate the
protective order in the future. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10a(c) (Supp. 1994). See supra Part 1.
81. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(3) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
82. See infra Part llI.B.3. See also W. VA. COALrTON AGAINST DoMESTIc VIOLENCE,
PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST, supra note 63, at I (noting that the telephone authorization statute is "unworkable in situations when there is no telephone available, because a police officer cannot secure telephone authorization through a dispatcher").
83. H.B. 2427; Letter from David B. McMahon, Attorney at Law, West Virginia Legal
Services Plan, Inc., to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, Team Coordinators, West Virginia Coali-
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limitations to ensure that there would be no abuse of discretion in
these situations and closely resembled the current probable cause warrantless arrest statute. 85 However, cautious legislative concerns about
the draft provision's constitutionality resulted in the approval of the
telephone authorization statute.86
In its original version, the telephone authorization statute closely
resembled a probable cause warrantless arrest statute in that it would
have authorized the officer to make an arrest in two instances: (1) "if
the officer observes physical injuries to the victim and has some credible evidence that the accused did it"; and (2) "if there is a written or
verbal statement that the abuse occurred and some corroborating physical evidence of the abuse, plus some credible evidence that the accused
did it."87 To prevent the officer from abusing this arrest authority and
to ensure that the statute was constitutional, the bill "specifically [did]
not authorize entry into premises or other search or seizure unless
necessary to make the arrest." 8
Despite these careful considerations, the West Virginia state legislature continued to be concerned about the constitutionality of a probable cause warrantless arrest statute. 9 Various studies indicated that a
probable cause warrantless arrest statute would most likely be constitutional under both the West Virginia and the United States Constitution.9" However, because the state legislature remained unpersuaded,
tion Against Domestic Violence 2 (Feb. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Letter from David B.
McMahon to Sue Julian & Diane Reese] (on file with author).
84. Letter from David B. McMahon to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, supra note 83, at

2.
85. See W. VA.

CODE

§ 48-2A-14 (Supp. 1994).

86. See infra text accompanying note 88.
87. Letter from David B. McMahon to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, supra note 83, at
2. See H.B. 2427 at 4.
88. Letter from David B. McMahon to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, supra note 83, at 2
(brackets added). See also H.B. 2427 at 4.

89. Law Must Be Changed, THE

HERALD-DISPATCH

(Huntington, W. Va.), July 15,

1993, at A6; The System Doesn't Work, supra note 1, at D2; Letter from David B.
McMahon to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, supra note 83, at 2; Memorandum of Law from
David B. McMahon, supra note 39, at 1-6.
90. LERMAN, supra note 36, at 1-2; Letter from Franklin D. Cleckley, Attorney at
Law/Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, to Sue
Julian & Diane Reese, Team Coordinators, West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Vio-
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the telephone authorization statute was substituted for the originally
proposed probable cause warrantless arrest version. Hence, West Virginia temporarily required a more rigid and complicated procedure
before a law-enforcement officer could arrest an alleged abuser in a
domestic violence situation. The end result suspended a victim's protection until the officer had satisfied all of the necessary pre-arrest
requirements."
2.

Statutory
Statute

Provisions

of the Telephone

Authorization

The telephone authorization statute attempted to increase arrest
authority by creating two additional situations in which law-enforcement officers would have the authority to arrest an alleged abuser in a
domestic violence incident.92 In both of these circumstances, however,
the officer's arrest authority was substantially limited by numerous
prerequisites to the arrest. An officer could arrest the alleged abuser if:
(1) the officer had corroborative evidence that the offense occurred;93
(2) the officer obtained a signed statement from the victim or from a
witness to the offense;94 and (3) the officer obtained authorization
(telephonic or oral) from a magistrate to arrest the alleged abuser.95
The officer's receipt of this authorization was conditioned upon the
magistrate finding that "probable cause exist[ed] to believe that the
'
offense was committed."96
An officer could also arrest an alleged abuser where imminent
"danger exist[ed] to the health and safety of the alleged victim, the

lence I (Sept. 11, 1992) [hereinafter Letter from Franklin D. Cleckley to Sue Julian &
Diane Reese, Sept. 11, 1992] (on file with author); Letter from Joan Zorza to Sue Julian &
Diane Reese, supra note 20, at 3; Memorandum of Law from David B. McMahon, supra
note 39, at 1-6.
91. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
92. W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-14(a), 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B.
2427.
93. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(1) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
94. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(2) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
95. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(3) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
96. Id.
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law-enforcement officer or another person."97 The officer could arrest
the alleged abuser in this situation only after obtaining (1) corroborative evidence that the offense occurred; and (2) a written or verbal
statement from either the victim or a witness to the offense, with the
assurance that a signed, written statement would soon be executed.98
In this circumstance, the officer could arrest the alleged abuser before
obtaining a magistrate's authorization because the alleged abuser was
perceived as posing a serious danger to the health and safety of those
involved.99 Given the often violent nature of such incidents, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which there would not have been an
imminent threat to the health or safety of the victim, law-enforcement
officer, or another individual.' However, the legislature determined
that the officer's authority to arrest, without having first completed all
of the prerequisite steps, was limited only to this specific imminent
danger situation.'
3.

Practical Assessment of the Telephone Authorization
Statute

Implementation of the telephone authorization statute proved that
the statute was an insufficient means of addressing the needs of domestic violence victims in West Virginia." 2
97. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
98. Id.
99. Id. However, if the magistrate, once contacted, refused to authorize the arrest, the
arrest became invalid and the alleged abuser was immediately released. W. VA. CODE § 482A-14(c) (Supp. 1993)(repealed 1994); H.B. 2427. The arrest could also be invalidated if the
victim or the witness refused to "execute the [signed] statemenf' as required by the statute.
Id.
100. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
For example, domestic violence victims often experience abuse that results in serious
physical injuries. One such woman described her ordeal as follows: "When the police
knocked on the door he stopped choking me and let them in. [M]y face had already started
to swell, my lip was bloody and I was gasping for air while laying on the floor." W. VA.
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIc VIOLENCE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 2, at I (victim's
statement). See also W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIc VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN THE NATION AND IN THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA I (n.d.) ("battering is the single
largest cause of injury to women in the United States").
101. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
102. Telephone Interview with Sue Julian, Team Coordinator, West Virginia Coalition
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Even though the telephone authorization statute was in place for
less than one year,0 3 its enforcement proved to be logistically impos-

sible. In order for a telephone authorization statute to work effectively,
law-enforcement officials must have access to telephones or mobile
radios with which they can contact the dispatcher and the magistrate.
Given the rural nature of West Virginia, though, many households
simply do not have telephones.' ° Certain rural areas are also too re-

mote for public telephones to be readily available. While mobile radios
are an option, not every police officer carries such a radio or has one
available in the officer's car;'. 5 those officers that do have radios often cannot use them because the mountainous terrain blocks the signal
transmission.' Thus, many law-enforcement officials could not arrest
an alleged abuser because they could not contact a magistrate to obtain
authority for he arrest as required by the telephone authorization stat07
ute.
While the officer could have arrested the alleged abuser if the
situation presented imminent "danger ... to the health and safety of
the alleged victim, the law-enforcement officer[,] or another person,"'08 this alternative was merely discretionary' 9 and likely to be

Against Domestic Violence (Feb. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Sue Julian];
Telephone Interview with Reta K. Roberts, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Marshall
University (Sept 30, 1993) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Reta K. Roberts]. See also
W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE, PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST, supra note
63, at 1 (noting that the telephone authorization statute is "unworkable in situations when
there is no telephone available, because a police officer cannot secure telephone authorization
through a dispatcher").
103. Previous W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994) became effective
July 9, 1993. Cunent W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14 (Supp. 1994) became effective May 31,
1994.
104. In 1990, 10.3% of all West Virginia households did not have a telephone. Only
three states (Mississippi, New Mexico, and Arkansas) had fewer telephones per household
than West Virginia. Barbara Vobejda, A Nation in Transition: Census Reveals Striking Stratification of U.S. Society, WASH. POST, May 29, 1992, at Al.
105. See Telephone Interview with Sue Julian, supra note 102; Telephone Interview
with Reta K. Roberts, supra note 102.
106. See supra note 105.
107. See supra note 105; W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(3) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994);
H.B. 2427.
108. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994); H.B. 2427.
109. id. See supra Part III.A.4.
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ignored in light of the common perception of domestic violence incidents as relatively minor offenses." ° Hence the telephone authorization statute, in practice, provided virtually no protection for the victim
of domestic violence.
C. Current Statutory Authority: The Probable Cause Warrantless
Arrest Statute
West Virginia's most recent efforts to provide greater protection to
the victims of domestic violence have resulted in the enactment of the
probable cause warrantless arrest statute."' With the adoption of this
provision, West Virginia joins the other forty-nine states in granting
law-enforcement officials broader arrest authority in response to domestic violence incidents."'
1.

Legislative History of the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest
Statute

As noted in Part III.B.1, the implementation of a probable cause
warrantless arrest statute in West Virginia was not a novel objective." 3 In fact, the current statute closely resembles the draft version
of the telephone authorization statute; the current statute permits an
arrest where a law-enforcement official "has observed credible corroborative evidence"' 4 that a domestic violence offense has occurred and
either "has received, from the victim or a witness, a verbal or written
allegation of facts constituting" a criminal domestic violence offense" 5' or "has observed credible evidence that the accused committed the offense.""'

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
David B.

See infra Part W.A.
See infra Part III.C.1.
See supra text accompanying note 20.
See supra Part III.B.1.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a)(3) (Supp. 1994). See also H.B. 4013. Cf Letter from
McMahon to Sue Julian & Diane Reese, supra note 83, at 2.
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While constitutional concerns prevented the adoption of the telephone authorization statute's draft version,1 7 repeated assurances
about the constitutionality of a probable cause warrantless arrest statute
in West Virginia reduced fears about the statute's potential unconstitutionality.' Rather, the impetus to enact the current statute was fueled
largely by persistent lobbying efforts that emphasized the ineffectiveness of the telephone authorization statute in adequately addressing the
safety of domestic violence victims."' Lobbyists also called attention
to the fact that West Virginia, with its telephone authorization statute,
remained ineligible for federal grants awarded to states with domestic
violence-oriented probable cause warrantless arrest statutes.' 20
2. Statutory Provisions of the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest
Statute
The current probable cause warrantless arrest statute significantly
broadens a law-enforcement official's ability to arrest an alleged abuser
in a domestic violence situation. The statute expands the officer's authority to make the arrest 2' and enlarges the scope of the "credible

117. See supra text accompanying note 89.
118.

See W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST,

supra note 63, at I (noting that "[I]egislation permitting warrantless arrest is not unconstitutional in West Virginia" (emphasis in original)); Letter from Franklin D. Cleckley, Attorney
at Law/Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law, to
Sue Julian & Diane Reese, Team Coordinators, West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic
Violence I (Feb. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Letter from Franklin D. Cleckley to Sue Julian &
Diane Reese, Feb. 8, 1994] (on file with author) (stating, "Isee no constitutional problem
with the bill you have put together"). See also supra text accompanying note 90.
119. See W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST,
supra note 63, at I (noting that the telephone authorization statute is "unworkable in situations when there is no telephone available, because a police officer cannot secure telephone
authorization through a dispatcher" and that "[w]arrantless . . . arrest laws make an enormous difference in police effectiveness in stopping domestic violence").
120. See W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST,
supra note 63, at I (noting that "West Virginia will be ineligible to apply for $25 million
in federal grants included in the Violence Against Women Act because we do not permit
warrantless arrest of abusers"); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
121. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a) (Supp. 1994).
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corroborative evidence" necessary to support the arrest of an alleged
offender. 1
A law-enforcement official now has the authority to arrest a "family or household member [who] is alleged to have committed a violation of the provisions of [§ 61-2-28] against another family or household member" ' without first obtaining a warrant or telephonic authorization from a magistrate. An officer has this arrest authority when:
(1) The law-enforcement officer has observed credible corroborative evidence that the offense has occurred; and
(2) The law-enforcement officer has received, from the victim or a witness, a verbal or written allegation of facts constituting a violation of

[§ 61-2-28]; or
(3) The law-enforcement officer has observed credible evidence that the
accused committed the offense. 2 '

Thus, a law-enforcement official has the authority to effectuate a warrantless arrest based upon the probable cause supplied by "credible
corroborative evidence" that the offense occurred and upon either a
verbal or written allegation of facts or the official's own observation of
"credible corroborative evidence" that the alleged abuser committed the
offense.25
Moreover, the expanded definition of "credible corroborative evidence" enables the law-enforcement officials to treat as evidence a
variety of factors that would normally tend to indicate that an incident
of domestic violence had occurred.'26 For example, "credible corroborative evidence" may consist of rather obvious circumstances such as:
(1) Condition of the alleged victim. - One or more contusions, scratches, cuts, abrasions, swellings; missing hair; torn clothing or clothing

122. W.
123. W.
(Supp. 1994)
assault).
124. See

125.

VA. CODE

§ 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1994).

VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a) (Supp. 1994). See also W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28
(defining and providing criminal penalties for domestic battery and domestic
supra note 123.
§ 48-2A-14(a) (Supp. 1994).

W. VA. CODE
W. VA. CODE

126.
§ 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1994). The former telephone authorization
statute did not define the term "credible corroborative evidence." See W. VA. CODE § 482A-14 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1994).
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in disarray consistent with a struggle; observable difficulty in breath-

ing or breathlessness consistent with the effects of choking or a body
blow; observable difficulty in movement consistent with the effects of
a body blow or other unlawful physical contact.
(2) Condition of the accused. - Physical injury or other conditions similar to those set out for the condition of the victim which are consistent with the alleged offense or alleged acts of self-defense by the
victim.
(3) Condition of the scene. - Damaged premises or furnishings; disarray
or misplaced objects consistent with the effects of a struggle.
(4) Other conditions. -

Statements by the accused admitting one or

more elements of the offense; threats made by the accused in
the presence of an officer; audible evidence of a disturbance
heard by the dispatcher or other agent receiving the request for
police assistance; written statements by witnesses.'

"Credible corroborative evidence" also includes any other "evidence
that is worthy of belief and corresponds with the allegations of one or
28
more elements of the offense.'
Therefore, the probable cause warrantless arrest statute provides
more protection to victims of domestic violence by granting law-enforcement officials increased authority to make an immediate arrest in
response to an occurrence of domestic violence because it does not
condition the officer's ability upon the obtainment of a warrant or
telephonic authorization from a magistrate. 2 The statute also lends
more credibility to a victim's allegations of abuse through the broader
definition of "credible corroborative evidence," which permits the officer to arrest the alleged abuser.'
3.

Practical Assessment of the Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest
Statute

Because the probable cause warrantless arrest statute is still relatively new, statistics as to the statute's actual effectiveness are not yet

127. W. 'VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1994).

128. Id
129. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(a) (Supp. 1994).
130. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14(b) (Supp. 1994).
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available."' However, proponents of this statute suggest that it will
vastly improve the plight of domestic violence victims in West Virginia.
First, and foremost, advocates predict that the probable cause warrantless arrest statute will allow law-enforcement officials to more
efficiently intervene in domestic violence situations and facilitate the
punishment of alleged abusers.'
These proponents suggest that, because the probable cause warrantless arrest statute operates to permit
more immediate arrests of alleged abusers, the statute will "hold
perpe33
behavior."'
abusive
and
violent
their
for
trators accountable
In addition, the speedy arrests permitted by a probable cause warrantless arrest statute will benefit victims of domestic violence. The
statute assures them that law-enforcement officials will be able to respond and react to domestic violence situations more efficiently. Advocates suggest that:
Probable cause arrest in domestic violence situations may empower a victim with the knowledge that police will respond effectively with the tools

to take action in an effort to stop the violence immediately ....A victim is more likely to use the system in the future, knowing that the crimi-

nal justice system acted once in the past to support her.'34

Since victims know that they are more certain to receive the assistance
that they need, they will be more likely to request such help.
Moreover, the probable cause warrantless arrest statute will positively affect society as a whole by actively condemning alleged abusers. Supporters propose that:

131. See H.B. 4013 ("[p]assed March 2, 1994; in effect ninety days from passage")
(effective May 31, 1994); see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14 (Supp. 1994).
132. W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIc VIOLENCE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES I (n.d.) [hereinafter W. VA. CoALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS] (suggesting that "[w]hen

there is no arrest, no prosecution, and no significant consequences for domestic violence,
abusers are free to flaunt to the victim the reality that society allows the abuse to occur or
at least does nothing effective to intervene").
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2.
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[T]he balance of benefits from an arrest must be assessed not only from

the point of view of deterring continued abuse within one couple but also,
and perhaps more importantly, from the point of view of the community's
critical interest in addressing the problem of domestic violence on a societal and long-term basis. Arresting and removing the abuser may thus be
important, quite apart from any specific deterrent effect, because arrest
delivers an empowering message to the victim and communicates society's
condemnation of the abusive behavior ..

.,.

Because this statute permits an almost immediate arrest and, therefore,
zealously condemns domestic violence, society as a whole will benefit

from a greater sense of community disapproval of domestic violence.
Finally, with the adoption of the probable cause warrantless arrest
statute, West Virginia will now be eligible to receive federal grants
designed to help states improve their enforcement of domestic violence
laws.'36 Consequently, West Virginia will have more resources with
which to educate law-enforcement officials about the nature of domestic violence and enforcement of newly enacted domestic violence stat37
utes. 1
Therefore, proponents of West Virginia's probable cause warrantless arrest statute suggest that it will have a marked effect in providing
additional protection to victims of domestic violence. However, until
the true test of time has passed, no one can be absolutely certain that
this statute will effectively combat domestic violence in West Virginia.
IV.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
WARRANTLESS ARREST STATUTES

States introduced probable cause warrantless arrest statutes in order
to afford more safety and protection to victims of domestic violence. 138 However, one must ask whether these statutes actually provide for the victim's safety immediately after the violence has occurred

135. Id.

136.
137.
lence is
138.

See supra note 22.
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-I(a)(3) (Supp. 1994) (stating that "[flamily vioa major health and law-enforcement problem in this state").
Frisch, supra note 29, at 209.
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and whether these statutes provide for the long-term protection of the
victims of such abuse.
A. Positive Benefits of Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statutes
Law-enforcement officers and victims' advocates have hailed the
enactment of probable cause warrantless arrest statutes as a positive
step towards protecting victims of domestic violence.'39 Primarily,
these statutes have been well-received because they increase awareness
of domestic violence as a serious crime, and, in cases of mandatory
arrest for violation of a protective order, they emphasize the seriousness of the court order. 4 ° By raising public consciousness, these provisions ensure that domestic violence will be perceived and treated as a
crime against "society as a whole,"'' rather than as merely an offense against the individual victim. The increase in police power granted under these provisions forces alleged abusers and victims alike to
fully appreciate the seriousness of these offenses and to recognize that
incidents of domestic violence will be treated with the same severity as
other similarly violent crimes. 4 '
In addition, these statutes reflect an effort to recognize the grave
danger that women often encounter in the home.'43 For example,
women face nine times more danger in the home than on the
streets.144 Moreover, "[i]n the United States, a woman is more likely

139. LERMAN, supra note 36, at I (noting that "[a] policy of arrest, when the elements
of the offense are present, promotes the well-being of the victim . . . . The officer who
starts legal action may give the [victim] courage she needs to realistically face and correct
the situation").
140. New Court Decisions: Family Law: Abuse, 52 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2223 (Oct. 25,
1983) [hereinafter New Court Decisions: Family Law].
141. Thomas Suddes, Lawmaker Calls for Arrests in Domestic Violence Cases, PLAIN
DEALER (Columbus, Ohio), June 15, 1993, at B8 [hereinafter Suddes].
142. New Police Guidelines for Domestic Violence, UNTED PRESS INT'L (Boston,
Mass.), July 24, 1991, at Regional News [hereinafter New Police Guidelines for Domestic
Violence] (comparing domestic violence with assault and battery); Elizabeth Ross, New Laws
Aim to Aid Battered Women, CmlSTnAN SCIENCE MONrrOR (Boston, Mass.), Aug. 6, 1991,
at 7 [hereinafter Ross] (recognizing domestic violence as a violent crime).
143. Chris Black, Judges Get More Calls on Domestic Abuse; New Law Spurs AfterHours Restraint Requests, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 1991, at 13 [hereinafter Black].
144. New Police Guidelines for Domestic Violence, supra note 142, at Regional News.
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to be assaulted, injured, raped, or killed by a male partner than by any
other type of assailant."' 45 In response to these concerns, probable
cause warrantless arrest statutes focus "on the victims as [their] top
priority."' 4 6 These provisions both recognize the traditional disparity
in treatment between alleged abusers-in domestic violence cases-and
other individuals accused of similar crimes and seek to remedy this

discrepancy: "Physical assault of a stranger is a crime; it's always been
a crime, there's never been any' question about it .

. .

. [S]ociety

should [not] tolerate [domestic violence] just because it happens between family members."' 47
Moreover, these statutes are praised for the efficiency that they
afford to law-enforcement officers in the handling of domestic violence
cases and for the various safeguards that they provide for victims of
domestic violence. The quality of the law-enforcement response to
domestic calls is enhanced where (1) officers may make arrests, rather

See also Dealing with Domestic Violence, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Boston, Mass.),
Oct. 28, 1991, at 20 [hereinafter Dealing with Domestic Violence].
145. NAT'L WOMAN ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT, supra note 10, at 1 (stating that
"[t]he Federal Bureau of Investigation reports that 30% of female homicide victims are
killed by their husbands or boyfriends").
1.'
146. Biddle, supra note 42, at
147. Id. at 1. See also New.Police Guidelines for Domestic Violence, supra note 142,
at Regional News. Spouse abuse has historically been treated as a private affair between
husband and wife. John C. Lenderman, New Policies Aid Domestic Violence Victims, ST.
PETERSBURG TnEs (St Petersburg, Fla.), June 26, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Lenderman]. For
this reason, alleged abusers are often not prosecuted as severely as are perpetrators of other,
comparatively minor, offenses. Kathy Barrett Carter, New Domestic Violence Law Sounds
Great, But . . . , N.J.L.J., Nov. 14, 1991, at 17. The de-emphasis of the severity of domestic violence is very apparent when shoplifters (whose theft was less than $250.00 worth of
merchandise) received a harsher punishment (jail time and fines) than did batterers (no arrest, and consequently, no jail time and no fines). Id. at 17. This anomaly may be explained
by the fact that the few abusers who were arrested and sentenced to jail used a weapon in
the commission of the offense; yet simply because the "unpenalized" batterers did not use a
weapon to commit the abuse, their crime was relegated to a rather insignificant status as
compared to shoplifting. Id. at 17. Finally, however, this ludicrousness is being recognized
and remedied:
Something is wrong when money interests hold greater sway over the criminal
justice system than the lives of women and children. What argument could possibly
be made to support the notion that a person who steals a few cartons of cigarettes
is a greater threat than someone who is beating his wife?
Id. at 17.
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than attempt to mediate the dispute;14 1 (2) emergency protective orders may be obtained "after normal working hours"; 49 (3) the officer
is authorized to seize any weapons used to commit the abuse;' (4)
extensive police training' reduces the number of homicides resulting
from domestic violence;' 52 and (5) law-enforcement officials are able
to avoid liability for false arrests of alleged 5abusers
and for denial of
3
equal protection to domestic violence victims.
Finally, the victim may feel safer and more secure where (1) mandatory arrests of the alleged abuser permit the victim to escape further
immediate danger; 54 (2) protective orders are readily available and
enforced;'55 (3) "voluntary" reconciliations may not be legally enforced; 6 (4) the abuser faces a minimum imprisonment for the second, and any additional, violation of a protective order;'57 (5) advocates are available to help the victim complete forms and to inform the
victim about available resources; 58 (6) local law-enforcement detach-

148.
149.
at night
150.
1993, at
151.

Biddle, supra note 42, at 1.
Black, supra note 143, at 13. In addition, protective orders may often be obtained
and on weekends and holidays. Id. at 13.
Eric S. Spevak, Domestic Violence Law Given Broader Sweep, N.J.L.J., May 10,
11 [hereinafter Spevak, Domestic Violence Law].
Cindy Hancock Finney, Deputies Train to Defuse Family Violence, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIBUNE (Orlando, Fla.), Apr. 25, 1991, at I1 [hereinafter Finney].
152. Approximately one-third of all female murder victims are also victims of domestic
violence. Lenderman, supra note 147, at 2. Where extensive law-enforcement training has
been conducted, with regard to appropriate responses to domestic violence incidents, the
"number of domestic abuse-related deaths dropped from eleven to four" in a two-year period. Finney, supra note 151, at I1.
153. Finney, supra note 151, at I1; New Police Guidelines for Domestic Violence, supra
note 142, at Regional News.
154. New Court Decisions: Family Law, supra note 140, at 2223.
155. Black, supra note 143, at 13.
156. Spevak, Domestic Violence Law, supra note 150, at 11. Security is attained by the
nonenforcement of "voluntary" reconciliations when victims have not voluntarily reconciled
with their alleged abusers, but rather have been persuaded or coerced to enter into a "voluntary" reconciliation agreement. See Torres v. Lancellotti, 607 A.2d 1375, 1377-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
157. Spevak, Domestic Violence Law, supra note 150, at 11.
158. Eric C. Spevak, A New and Improved Domestic Violence Law, N.J.L.J., Feb. 10,
1992, at 6 [hereinafter Spevak, New and Improved Domestic Violence Law].
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ments have adopted a "pro-arrest" policy; 59 and (7) intervention programs inform victims of the services available to them. 60
Hence, probable cause warrantless arrest statutes provide law-enforcement officials with the authority needed to "make immediate ar6
rests and [to] keep abusive spouses away from intended victims.' 1
The more gradual effect of these provisions, though, is to ensure that
these victims will have a secure "Home Safe Home."'6
B.

Criticisms of Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest Statutes

While probable cause warrantless arrest statutes result in increased
law-enforcement involvement in domestic violence disputes and more
arrests of alleged abusers, opponents of these statutes argue that in
reality these provisions do not adequately fulfill their purpose of protecting victims. Critics deem these statutes to be insufficient in providing for the victim's safety because they force police to intervene in
these disputes;' 63 because the subsequent arrests escalate the potential
for future, retaliatory abuse; 64 and because victims themselves often
become more victimized while the judicial system attempts to protect
their safety.'65
Critics of these statutes argue that the law-enforcement intervention
required by these provisions to ensure the victim's safety, in reality,
poses a grave danger to the officers who respond to these calls. 66 As
a result, officers are unable to fully protect the victim.'67 According
to these critics, law-enforcement officials have good reason to treat
159. Suddes, supra note 141, at B8. In the community

of Eastlake, Ohio, the

jurisdiction's adoption of a "pro-arrest policy" has been so "helpful to battered women that
some specifically choose to live in or move to Eastlake." Id.
160. Lenderman, supra note 147, at 2.
161. New Police Guidelines for Domestic Violence, supra note 142, at Regional News.
162. Dealing with Domestic Violence, supra note 144, at 20.
163. See Dealing with Domestic Violence, supra note 144, at 20; Finney, supra note
151, at I1; Lenderman, supra note 147, at 2.
164. See Toth, supra note 46, at A5.
165. See Ross, supra note 142, at 7; Hart, supra note 20, at 89, 102.
166. See Dealing with Domestic Violence, supra note 144, at 20; Finney, supra note
151, at II; Lenderman, supra note 147, at 2.
167. See supra note 166.
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these incidents of domestic violence as "just a little family quarrel" 16 8
because "the abuser may attack the officer.' 9 For example, in one
year alone police in a single community responded to domestic violence incidents that resulted in 290 arrests. 7" However, these same
officers also suffered 397 injuries while making the arrests. 7 '
In addition, law-enforcement officers are often unable to effectively respond to the situation because of the victim's reaction to their
presence at the scene.
[F]requently, deputies report seeing roles change in the victim's eyes
when they arrive on the scene. The victim may see the deputy as the
cause of the problem rather than the rescuer. The abusive husband or
boyfriend is seen as the victim, and she sees herself as the rescuer.
Sometimes
the woman denies the abuse happened or refuses to press
72
charges.
In these situations, "[t]he victim may be intimidated ... and worried
about how she will support herself and her family . . . .'
Where
the victim must press charges before the arrest can be made, officers
cannot complete the arrest necessary to ensure the victim's safety.
Thus, this argument contends that it is not feasible to expend so many
man-hours to combat every domestic violence incident at the risk of
injury and reduction in force, especially in circumstances where the
victim sought to be "rescued" refuses to cooperate. 74
In response to these arguments, advocates demonstrate that statutes
providing for mandatory arrest do not require the victim to press
charges while the victim's abuser is present. 7 This solution provides

168. Dealing with Domestic Violence, supra note 144, at 20.

169. Finney, supra note 151, at II.
170. Lenderman, supra note 147, at 2.
171. Id. See also Finney, supra note 151, at I1. It is important to note, however, that
the report did not indicate the severity of the injuries or the frequeficy of comparable injuries that occurred in response to other types of crimes. See Lenderman, supra note 147, at
2.
172. Finney, supra note 151, at I1.
173. Id. at I1.
174. Finney, supra note 151, at I1; Lenderman, supra note 147, at 2.
175.

See, e.g., New Police Guidelines for Domestic Violence, supra note 142, at Re-

gional News.
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for "laws [that] require police officers to arrest batterers on the spot if
there is probable cause. No longer must officers put the burden of
accusation on an abused and frightened woman, asking her, in the
presence of her batterer, 'Do you want to press charges?"" 76 Thus,
the victim's intimidation that creates the perceived "role reversal" may
be alleviated to some extent by the enactment of mandatory arrest
statutes.
A second criticism of these statutes questions their ability to prevent future attacks against victims. Recent studies have suggested that
probable cause warrantless arrest statutes do not have a deterrent effect
and may, in fact, accelerate the recurrence of domestic violence and
encourage retaliatory abuse.' The authors of the Minneapolis study,
whose findings proclaimed that probable cause warrantless arrest statutes were in fact an adequate deterrent,' have recently discovered
that this is not always the case. In the short term, subsequent abuse is
definitely deterred by an arrest: "if no arrest was made after apparent
abuse, a domestic violence victim had a 7% chance of being battered
again immediately after the police left the scene. If an arrest was
made, the victim had only a 2% chance of being battered immediately
' 79
when reunited with the offender.'
Long-term deterrent effects are less often realized:
Just 60 days after the offense, the study found there is no difference be-

tween arrested and non-arrested offenders in their risk of repeat violence.
And by the end of one year, arrests increased the rate of domestic violence by 44% among unemployed suspects and reduced it by 16% among
employed suspects .

. .

. [The research concludes that] mandatory arrest

laws favor people who are better off. Unemployed 80offenders, because of
economic stresses, become more violent after arrest.

176. Dealing with Domestic Violence, supra note 144, at 20.
177. Toth, supra note 46, at A5. See Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 137-69 (1992) [hereinafter Sherman et al.].

178. See supra Part II.
179. Toth, supra note 46, at A5. See Sherman et al., supra note 177, at 137-69.
180. Toth, supra note 46, at A5 (brackets added).
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To counter the argument that arresting attackers often does more
harm than good for the victims of domestic violence, advocates of the
statutes suggest that just because the arrests do not provide a perfect
and infallible deterrent is no reason to decide that they do not work.
There's deterrent, but also punishment . . . . We don't have people
calling for the repeal of burglary laws because they don't have a deterrent
effect. Why not arrest someone who has committed a crime? A crime is a
crime is a crime. It should be treated the same in a home as it is on the
street.' 8'

Thus, advocates suggest that the certain punitive nature of these laws
greatly outweighs their limited effectiveness in deterring domestic violence.
Finally, critics of probable cause warrantless arrest statutes oppose
the arrest provisions because victims often become exploited by the
judicial system. These statutes can be problematic where police must
make mandatory "dual arrests," arresting both the abuser and the victim, without first having to determine who was the primary aggressor
In
and whether or not one of the parties acted in self-defense.'
these circumstances, "'[w]hat happens . . is the direct opposite of
It's a process that has victims going through a
what's intended ....
re-victimization process."" 3 However, this situation may be remedied
by providing victims with a "right to relief when the victim uses reasonable force in self-defense."' 84 Thus, the victim would not be powerless against the abuser, and would not be subsequently punished for
attempts at self-protection.
C. Analysis
While these statutes have been strongly criticized for the reasons
stated above, legislators, law-enforcement officials, and victims' advo-

181. Id
182. Ross, supra note 142, at 7; Hart, supra note 20, at 89, 102.
183. Ross, supra note 142, at 7.
184.

Spevak, New and Improved Domestic Violence Law, supra note 158, at 6.
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cates adamantly declare that the most effective and preferred method of
combatting domestic violence is through the arrest of the alleged abuser.'85 Efforts have been made to address these enumerated concerns
and to remedy the inevitable deficiencies lurking in these provisions.'86 Irrespective of the potential for future retaliatory acts of violence, the proponents of probable cause warrantless arrest statutes continue to argue that society can curb domestic violence only by treating
87
it as the violent crime that it really is.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Probable cause warrantless arrest statutes afford much greater protection to victims of domestic violence than traditional approaches requiring an arrest warrant or a law-enforcement officer's personal observation of the offense. However, even this model is not perfect in its
attempts to safeguard victims of domestic violence. In particular, the
aspects of West Virginia's probable cause warrantless arrest statute that
merit the greatest attention are the constitutionality of a probable cause
warrantless arrest provision and the potential for non-deterrence.
The constitutionality of a probable cause warrantless arrest statute
has continuously been of primary importance to the West Virginia state
legislature. While courts in other states have upheld the validity of
such provisions,' West Virginia courts have not yet determined the
statute's constitutionality. Nevertheless, preliminary research suggests
that any constitutional challenge to such a provision would fail."8 9

185. LERMAN, supra note 36, at 1; Suddes, supra note 141, at B8; Hart, supra note 20,
at 87.
186. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 20, at 101-04.
187. See supra note 152. See also supra note 142.
188. LERMAN, supra note 36, at 1-2; Letter from Joan Zorza to Sue Julian & Diane
Reese, supra note 20, at 3. See LeBlanc v. State, 382 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1980); State ex
rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232 (Mo. 1982).
189.

See W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE, PROBABLE CAUSE ARREST,

supra note 63, at 1 (noting that "[1]egislation permitting warrantless arrest is not unconstitutional in West Virginia" (emphasis in original)); Letter from Franklin D. Cleckley to Sue
Julian & Diane Reese, Feb. 8, 1994, supra note 118, at 1 (stating, "I see no constitutional
problem with the bill you have put together"). See also supra text accompanying note 90.
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In addition, one must consider the potential for non-deterrence
given West Virginia's high rate of unemployment. Recent studies indicate that probable cause warrantless arrest statutes have a questionable
deterrent effect in the prevention of subsequent episodes of domestic
violence,'90 particularly in circumstances involving unemployed abusers. Research suggests that "[i]n places . . . with [a] high rate of un-

employment, a mandatory arrest policy is like throwing oil on the
flames."' 9' One must determine, therefore, whether the probable cause
warrantless arrest statute is prudent in light of West Virginia's propensity for unemployment. In July 1994, statistics revealed that West Virginia had an 8.7% unemployment rate, one of the highest in the United
States.'92 Given that "[u]nemployed offenders, because of economic
stresses, become more violent after arrest"'93 and that, one year after
the offender had been arrested, "the rate of domestic violence [increased] by 44% among unemployed suspects,"'94 a probable cause
warrantless arrest statute in a state with a high unemployment rate may
not necessarily be the surest way to safeguard victims of domestic violence.
Despite West. Virginia's socioeconomic status, however, critics
urging the "unemployment perspective" fail to consider the real-life
dynamics of domestic violence. Steadfast proponents of the probable
cause warrantless arrest statute suggest that:
When batterers assault their victims subsequent to an arrest it is a misconception to assume that the assault is a direct result of the arrest rather
than the responsibility and choice of the offender. Battering is not a single
incident but a pattern of controlling behavior that escalates in frequency
and severity over time. Faulting the arrest as the cause of subsequent violence exempts the perpetrator from accepting responsibility to end the
long-term expected progression of violence.' 95

190. See supra Part IV.B.
191. Toth, supra note 46, at A5.
192. Regional Outlook '94 National Overview: Expansion Moves at Slower Pace, Daily

Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at D-37 (Sept. 6, 1994).
193. Toth, supra note 46, at A5.
194. id. at A5.
195. W. VA. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENcE, QuESTIoNs AND ANSWERS,
supra note 132, at 2 (emphasis in original). See also W. VA. FAMILY PROTECTION ADVISO-

RY BOARD, supra note 24, at 22-26 (describing the cycle of domestic violence that occurs
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Hence, the probable cause warrantless arrest statutes should not escalate
or contribute to the incidence of violence in battering relationships
because recurrent violence is characteristic of such relationships.
Because the West Virginia probable cause warrantless arrest statute
has been in effect for less than one year, 96 data as to its usefulness
in ensuring the safety and protection of domestic violence victims is
unavailable. It is evident, however, that this statute is a vast improvement over the previous telephone authorization statute in its practical
contributions toward combatting domestic violence. 97
West Virginia claims that it has recognized that "battering is a
crime that will no longer be excused or tolerated."' 98 In order to live
up to its promise to keep victims of domestic violence "safe in their
homes,"' 99 West Virginia must ensure that the current probable cause
warrantless arrest statute will be actively enforced. Only then will victims of domestic violence truly have a "Home Safe Home.""0 0
Toni L. Harvey

in the majority of battering relationships).
196. See H.B. 4013 ("[p]assed March 2, 1994; in effect ninety days from passage")
(effective May 31, 1994); see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-14 (Supp. 1994).
197. See supra Part III.C.3.
198. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-l(b)(5) (Supp. 1994).
199. W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-l(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
200. Dealing with Domestic Violence, supra note 144, at 20.
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